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The First Amendment right to freedom of expression is a defining fea-
ture of American society. Yet the scope and meaning of this right have always
been controversial. In recent years, much of the debate has focused on issues
like hate speech and pornography. Supporters of regulation argue that such
speech causes serious injury to individuals and groups and that it assaults their
dignity as human beings and citizens. Civil libertarians respond that our com-
mitment to free expression is measured by our willingness to protect it even
when it causes serious harm or offends our deepest values. When the issue is
framed in this way, we seem to face a tragic choice, one in which we can
protect human dignity only by sacrificing freedom of speech, and vice versa.
But both of these values are essential to a liberal democratic society. In this
way, hate speech and pornography seem to pose an intractable dilemma for
the American constitutional order.
Moreover, the problem is not confined to those forms of speech but extends
to First Amendment jurisprudence as a whole. Contemporary disputes often in-
volve conflicts between free expression and other values. Yet we have no coher-
ent framework that would allow us to determine when speech should receive
constitutional protection and when it should be subject to regulation. As a
result, controversies over freedom of speech often appear to be irresolvable.
To overcome these difficulties, we must transform our understanding of the
2 Introduction
First Amendment by developing a theory that is capable of reconciling free
speech with other values. That is the goal of this book. Freedom of expression,
I shall argue, is founded on respect for the autonomy and dignity of human
beings. At the same time, however, this principle also gives rise to other funda-
mental rights, ranging from personal security and privacy to citizenship and
equality. As a general rule, speakers should be required to respect the funda-
mental rights of others. In this way, the same ideals that justify freedom of
speech allow us to determine the limits of that freedom.
As I show in chapter 1, this understanding of the First Amendment has deep
roots in American constitutional history. Eighteenth-century Americans held
that freedom of speech was one of the natural rights of mankind and was
essential to republican government. Like all rights, however, free speech was
limited by the rights of others. In this way, the concept of rights provided a
standard by which to assess regulations of speech. As chapter 2 explains,
however, this traditional view no longer prevails. Instead, modern jurispru-
dence conceives of First Amendment issues not as conflicts of rights, but as
conflicts between the individual right to free speech and ‘‘social interests’’ such
as dignity and equality. But there is no clear way to resolve clashes between
individual rights and social interests. When First Amendment problems are
understood in this way, they seem to involve collisions between incommensur-
able values. That is one reason these disputes have become so bitter and
divisive. The best way to escape this predicament is to return to a rights-based
theory of the First Amendment.
Part 2 of the book develops such a theory, drawing both on the natural
rights tradition and on modern understandings of rights. According to this
theory, which is presented in chapters 3 and 4, rights are rooted in respect for
human beings and their capacity for self-determination. Rights represent what
it means for people to be free in various areas of life—not only in relation to
the external world, but also in their inner lives, in the social and political
realm, and in ‘‘the sphere of intellect and spirit.’’∞ These four elements of
liberty correspond to the major justifications that have been advanced for
freedom of speech: that it is an aspect of external freedom; that it is essential
for individual self-realization; that it is indispensable to democratic self-
government; and that it promotes the search for truth. But the same principles
that support free speech also support other fundamental rights, including
external rights to person and property; personality rights such as privacy and
reputation; and rights of citizenship and participation in the society. As I shall
explain, the people also have some rights as a community, including the rights
to engage in political deliberation and to govern themselves through the demo-
cratic process.
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On this view, freedom of speech must be exercised with due regard for the
rights of other individuals and the community as a whole. Speech that in-
fringes these rights should generally be regarded as wrongful and subject to
regulation through narrowly drawn laws. In some cases, however, the value of
the speech is so great that it should be protected despite the injury it causes. In
chapter 5, I develop a general approach to cases of this sort, using the constitu-
tional law of defamation as an illustration.
Chapter 6 contrasts this rights-based theory with the Supreme Court’s cur-
rent jurisprudence, which is based on the doctrine of content neutrality. That
doctrine holds that ‘‘above all else, the First Amendment means that govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.’’≤ Although this principle captures our strong
commitment to freedom of expression, it is fatally one-sided, for it fails to
recognize that some kinds of speech (such as defamation and incitement)
inflict serious injury precisely because of their content. For this reason, the
Court has carved out a series of exceptions to the content-neutrality doctrine.
Yet the Justices have never succeeded in explaining the rationale for these
exceptions or in squaring them with the general rule. As a result, the Court’s
First Amendment opinions often seem arbitrary and unpersuasive.
By contrast, I shall argue that the rights-based theory offers a more coherent
and principled account of the First Amendment freedom of speech. Of course,
I do not mean to say that this theory is capable of generating easy answers to
free speech problems. As I have stressed, these problems typically involve
important values on both sides. Individuals and groups will often disagree
about the relative importance of these values and about how conflicts between
them should be resolved. It follows that there will always be ideological dis-
agreement over the scope of free speech. The goal of First Amendment theory
should be not to eradicate such disagreement, but to develop a common lan-
guage or framework within which we can engage in reasoned debate about
controversial issues.
For several reasons, I believe that the rights-based theory is best suited to
provide such a framework. First, as I have noted, this theory can find strong
support in American constitutional history. Second, a belief in rights is deeply
embedded in our contemporary political culture. In many cases, the support-
ers and opponents of regulation are already inclined to state their positions in
the language of rights. By the same token, I believe that the principle that
freedom of speech is limited by the rights of others is capable of having strong
intuitive appeal, not only to the advocates themselves but also to the public at
large. Third, the notion of rights plays a pervasive role in American law. Thus,
the theory does not require lawyers and judges to use new or unfamiliar
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concepts, but instead invites them to determine the boundaries of free speech
in part by reference to concepts that have been carefully developed in other
areas, such as torts, criminal law, and constitutional law. Finally, the theory of
rights that I shall develop is based on the idea of mutual recognition and
respect: rights instantiate the respect that individuals owe one another as
human beings and citizens. Understood in this manner, the idea of rights may
offer a way to overcome the deep divisions and mistrust that mark current
debates over freedom of expression.
The final part of the book applies the rights-based theory to a wide range of
First Amendment controversies. In accord with the civil libertarian tradition,
chapter 7 argues that the Constitution should afford strong protection to
revolutionary speech, flag burning, and other forms of expression that criticize
the government or the existing political order. By contrast, I believe that the
state should have greater authority to regulate speech that is directed against
individuals or groups. As I explain in chapter 8, some forms of expression—
such as incitement, threats, and fighting words—should be denied constitu-
tional protection because they infringe the fundamental right to personal se-
curity or freedom from violence. In chapter 9, I argue that the state should also
be allowed to protect the right to privacy against unreasonable intrusion or
exposure. I then apply this view to a variety of contemporary problems, in-
cluding sidewalk counseling at abortion clinics, protests at military funerals,
and news reports that reveal the identity of rape victims. Finally, in chapters 10
and 11, I contend that some forms of hate speech and pornography can be
regulated on the ground that they violate the most basic right of all—the right
to recognition as a human being and a member of the community.
In short, this book argues that freedom of expression should be understood
within a broader conception of rights based on human dignity and autonomy.
This view recognizes a strong, liberal right to freedom of expression, at the
same time that it affords protection against the most serious forms of ‘‘assaul-
tive speech.’’≥ In this way, it seeks to develop some common ground between
civil libertarianism and its critics.
The view I present may also be called a liberal humanist theory of the First
Amendment. It is liberal in its emphasis on the protection of individual rights;
it is humanist in holding that those rights are founded on respect for the
intrinsic worth of human beings and are meant to enable them to develop their
nature to the fullest extent. I believe that a theory of this sort offers the best
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Chapter 1. Free Speech and the Natural Rights Tradition
1. For some leading works, see Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, ‘‘The People’s
Darling Privilege’’ (2000) [hereinafter Curtis, Free Speech]; Mark A. Graber, Transform-
ing Free Speech (1991); Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988);
Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (1985); David M. Rabban, Free Speech in its
Forgotten Years (1997); Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times (2004). For a superb collec-
tion of materials that explores many of the authors and ideas discussed in this book, see
Vincent Blasi, Ideas of the First Amendment (2006).
2. I should emphasize that this history is merely a starting point: I do not subscribe to
the originalist view that the Constitution must be interpreted in accord with the inten-
tions or the understanding of those who adopted it. For a discussion of the role that
history should play in constitutional interpretation, see p. 223 n.54.
3. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government bk. II, §§ 4, 6, 123–31 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) [hereinafter Locke, Government].
4. See, e.g., John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 47 (James Tully ed., Hackett
1983) (William Popple trans., 1689).
